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This research highlights the outcomes of the environmental diplomacy workshop held between members of civil 
society from Afghanistan and Pakistan on water cooperation in the Kabul River Basin, one of the most heavily conflicted 
transboundary river basins in the world. Lack of trust among these upstream and downstream riparian partners, hydro 
hegemonic frameworks of governance, and persistent failures of Track 1 diplomacy initiatives has led to an absence of 
governance mechanisms for mitigating the water security concerns in the region. The immediate problems identified to 
transboundary water rights, allocation, and security included a lack of focus on benefits to the local and rural population 
in the region, lack of access to water in rural areas, degrading water quality from multiple activities, and lack of scientific 
knowledge on the transboundary river systems to build better transboundary water relations, cooperation, and treaties. 
We argue that a collaborative civic-scientific social learning and engagement network can be an effective framework for 
building transboundary adaptive governance systems. Such an effort on social learning is focused on building a bottom 
up process by strengthening local capacity, local knowledge systems, and transboundary engagement and exchange. 
Initializing localized transboundary civic-scientific social learning capacities and exchanges can be a powerful avenue to 
building a localized adaptive governance framework. 
Keywords: transboundary water governance; water cooperation; environmental diplomacy; Kabul river basin; social             
learning 
Introduction 
Water is never managed for a single purpose. It supports multiple needs and interests—
ecological, domestic, agricultural, hydroelectric, industrial, and recreational, which can often turn 
contentious under conditions of scarcity of potable water (Wolf, Kramer, Carius, & Dabelko, 2005). 
Transboundary rivers make the issue of addressing multiple needs trickier. There are additional 
borders, actors, and networks to consider. Inadequate representation of multi-level actors and 
institutions in such cases can worsen transboundary disputes and create deadlocks to effective 
management of water resources.  
 
At the heart of the transboundary water politics as the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UNWC) puts it is the question of 
water cooperation and equity on matters of allocation and utilization. Established in 1997, UNWC 
prescribes “equitable and reasonable” use, considering the relevant factors: geography, hydrology, 
socio-economic needs, dependent populations, impacts of use, conservation, efficiency of use, and 
availability of other sources (UN General Assembly, 2014). Therefore, upstream and downstream 
states have to consider each other’s uses, both existing and potential reserves, when developing 
projects. While UNWC has set the course of expectations in water sharing and cooperation, the 
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implementation of these goals can be messy due to power differences between different user 
groups.   
 
Riparian relations and transboundary water cooperation present complex dynamics, which are 
never static or easily classifiable as black and white situations; hence, cooperation and conflicts are 
deeply entangled as a process. This process may pose serious water allocation and utilization 
challenges and a linked social order of institutions, people, and processes may be required to 
manage it (Mirumachi, 2015). Yoffe, Wolf, and Giordano (2003) define trans-boundary water 
conflicts as: discordant actions between or among nations over shared water resources, expressed 
through verbal, economic, or military hostility, and with “violent conflict” as the subset of militarily 
hostile actions over shared water resources. Water conflicts are also implicated in graver threats, 
such as the Syrian Civil War, which was fueled in part by a long drought that forced the migration 
of over a million rural Syrians into urban areas (Petersen-Perlman, Watson, & Wolf, 2018). 
However, not all water-related conflicts are so visible. Zeitoun and Warner (2006) show that some 
conflicts lie somewhere between the much feared but nonexistent water wars and water 
cooperation.  
Water Cooperation efforts in the Kabul River Basin  
Focusing on transboundary water conflicts and governance using traditional neo-realist/neo-
institutionalist paradigms is an insufficient approach to understanding the complex dynamics of 
transboundary water cooperation. This research offers a unique approach in understanding 
transboundary water cooperation by examining the participatory social learning processes of the 
localized non-state actors –community and scientific stakeholders – and their efforts at adaptive 
management to enhance trust building, information sharing, collaboration, and capacity building 
across the Kabul River basin between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Lee, 1999). The Kabul River Basin 
is an international river basin and a critical source for water, food and energy for both Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. 
 
The Kabul River Basin is one of the most conflict ridden areas in the world. As Pakistan faces a 
looming water crisis and as Afghanistan plans to increase its use of water resources to meet its 
increased demand for energy and agriculture, the tensions between these two countries are 
pronounced. Currently, there are no bilateral treaties or agreements in place to guide negotiations 
over the Kabul River Basin water supply. The lack of legitimate scientific data on the tributaries 
bordering the two countries further complicates the tensions across the borders. In the absence of 
these mechanisms, the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan on water security is heavily 
based on assumptions and the transboundary water politics is characterized by mistrust and 
suspicion, impeding any progress on negotiations for a successful transboundary cooperation 
between these countries (Kakakhel, 2017). The need for engaging localized sub-state or non-state 
partners including local civic, scientific, community, environmental, and political actors to enhance 
information sharing, capacity building, and collaboration on interventions across the immediate 
borders has been recognized (Saeed et al., 2016).  
 
The research presented is based on a week-long collaborative work-meeting among scientific and 
community leaders from both Afghanistan and Pakistan to explore the role and scope of scientific 
and public diplomacy (including community outreach, organizing, and engagement) in 
transboundary water cooperation, adaptive governance, and ecological preservation. We situate this 
study within the theoretical framework of hydro-hegemony and adaptive governance systems to 
develop a localized adaptive transboundary governance system based on social learning. The 
working sessions explored 1) the challenges to transboundary cooperation between Afghanistan 
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and Pakistan; 2) ways to increase transparency by addressing the knowledge gaps and uncertainties 
related to the Kabul River Basin; and 3) the ways scientific diplomacy and public diplomacy can aid 
water cooperation in the transboundary Kabul River Basin.  
Theoretical Underpinnings: Building adaptive governance systems for water cooperation   
As conditions of water scarcity, environmental degradation, and resource scarcity become 
pronounced due to developmental needs and climatic shifts, the risks for conflict and political 
tensions between states that may already have fragile relationships are intensifying (Haddadin, 
2001; Jansky, Pachova, & Murakami, 2004; Kliot, 1993; Lowi, 1993; Sosland, 2007). Conventional 
governance models are inadequate in addressing these evolving transboundary tensions. Instead 
proactive adaptive governance strategies are required to minimize risks and increase cooperation 
(Haddadin, 2001; Jansky, Pachova, & Murakami, 2004; Kliot, 1993; Lowi, 1993; Sosland, 2007).  
 
Two conventional models in governance in transboundary conflict resolution are the neo-
realist and neo-institutionalist (or neoliberal) paradigms (Mirumachi, 2015). Power is seen as the 
main factor shaping the outcome of discussions on bilateral issues in a neo-realist paradigm. Neo-
realists expect states to maximize their relative power rather than choose cooperation, especially if 
the upstream states attempt to reduce their dependence (e.g. trade or power) on downstream 
countries. Neo-realists may also challenge their neighbors’ sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
security. Neo-institutionalists and neo-liberalists, in comparison, reject the notion that power is the 
only factor that determines relationships between states. Neo-institutionalist focus on cooperation 
by mitigating the compliance problems and mistrust—with the help of institutions that provide 
information, lowered transaction costs, increased transparency, and reduced uncertainty. Such 
cooperation is accomplished often by utilitarian compliance or by incentivizing cooperation and 
normative compliance by the use of norms, regimes, treaties, policies, and political will and 
international law, often to the advantage of the hegemonic state (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Julien, 
2012; Slaughter, 2011). Neo-institutionalists also believe that scarcity and degradation may also 
justify technological innovations and infrastructural fixes to manage the crisis, with also a certain 
control of the society (Mirumachi, 2015; Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). According to the neoliberal 
paradigm, water management holds key to development, economic progress and social benefits. 
Both these models still do not address inequities, and democratic and adaptive ways of addressing 
transboundary tensions and cooperation. Zeitoun and Warner (2006) identifies this paradigm as 
the hydro-hegemony framework developed by the use of state-centric hegemonic approaches to 
guarantee cooperation which may include exertion of supremacy in water management to 
determine “who gets how much water, how and why” (p.436), where resources are not equally 
endowed. 
The identification of these hydro-hegemony frameworks have helped differentiate 
asymmetries in power relations that make it difficult to change the status quo of water allocations 
and cooperative mechanisms by the implementation of political persuasion and consent within civil 
society (Fontana, 1993). These studies show that the existing socio-political processes that attempt 
to determine the solutions and means to address water scarcity and environmental stewardship 
itself may be the process that brings about conflict and cooperation (Sneddon, 2013; Trottier, 2003; 
Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). Water peace and cooperation therefore can be a manipulated concept 
through which politics occur, and can mediate state/self-interests, allowing it to become a 
hegemonic concept (Mirumachi, 2015). Folke et al. (2005) note that adaptive self organizations or 
governing systems are more creative at adaptive co-management efforts and it ” lowers the costs of 
collaboration, conflict resolution, enable legislation, and governmental policies” (p. 41). 
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Pahl-Wostl (2007) defines adaptive management as “a systematic process for continually 
improving management policies and practices by learning from the outcomes of implemented 
management strategies” (p. 51). Adaptive governance systems are multilevel, integrated governance 
modes that include social networks that represents multiple interests, actors, and community-based 
initiates. Such systems may utilize integrative science that draws from various knowledge systems, 
experiences, and organizations through an open decision making process for the development of a 
common understanding and policies, in particular during periods of abrupt change or crisis in 
social-ecological systems (Folke et al., 2005). Adaptive systems hence highlight broader shifts from 
government to governance and the evolving, complex and dynamic nature of governance networks 
(Koliba, Meek, & Zia, 2010; Zia et al., 2014). Such systems also emphasize social learning as an 
integral component of governance. Strong institutions and social learning are essential for 
managing water scarcity and allocation issues (Pahl-Wostl, 2009). Social learning in river basin 
management is catered to building the capacity of different authorities, experts, interest groups, 
and the public to manage their river basins in a sustainable way while balancing multiple and 
competing interests for the benefit of the social-ecological system as a whole (Pahl-Wostl, 2007; 
2009). This model of social learning was utilized by the European project HarmoniCOP to increase 
participatory river basin management in Europe in order to generate practical and useful 
information to improve the scientific base of social learning in river basin management. Within 
adaptive systems, it is not the lack of water that leads to conflict, but the inadequate way the 
resources are governed and managed that leads to conflict. Carius et al. (2004) state  that “the 
likelihood of conflict rises as the rate of change within the basin exceeds the institutional capacity 
to absorb that change” (p. 61). 
There is a growing body of evidence that both Afghanistan and Pakistan have struggled with 
hydro hegemonic frameworks of cooperation with transboundary water management (Nagheeby & 
Warner, 2018). Oftentimes, access to water has been used as a geopolitical tool in the region to 
control territory for security and geopolitical interests. Thus, water resource development has had 
profound implications in shaping the geopolitical dynamics in Afghanistan (Nagheeby & Warner, 
2018), and Pakistan to a lesser extent. Additionally, regional hydo-hegomonic tensions have flared 
between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India with India supporting Afghanistan’s efforts to develop 
dams along the Kabul River and China supporting huge infrastructural projects in Pakistan 
(Kugelman et al., 2011; Shroder, 2016). Understanding the existing complex power dynamics and 
paradigms are helpful in redesigning cooperative civic-social strategies to shape adaptive 
transboundary water governance. In this research we examine the existing hegemonic frameworks 
that impede transboundary cooperation and identify avenues for building localized civic-scientific 
social learning efforts to enhance local adaptive transboundary governance systems. We argue that 
collaborative civic-scientific social learning processes can be an effective framework for building 
transboundary adaptive governance systems. Such an effort on social learning is focused on 
building a bottom up process, by strengthening local capacity to understand and estimate the local 
challenges to transboundary water management and to build localized and contextual solutions for 
the adaptive management of transboundary water resources across borders. Initiating localized 
transboundary social learning capacities can be a powerful avenue to lay the groundwork for 
peaceful cooperation and building a localized adaptive governance framework.  
Methodology 
Utilizing the concept of collaborative civic-scientific social learning, researchers from the 
University of Vermont and Bennington College hosted a week-long workshop in March 2018 for 11 
participants (six from Afghanistan and five from Pakistan) to initiate dialogue and in-depth 
discussions on water cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Kabul River basin. Over 
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20 participants were invited to attend the workshop at the Peace Centre at Dawson College in 
Montreal, a neutral place for people from both countries to gather, but only 11 were able to obtain 
visas to attend the workshop. Holding such a workshop on building localized water cooperation 
strategies in either Afghanistan or Pakistan would not have been feasible. The participants included 
community leaders and professionals from both countries as well as representatives of international 
funding agencies working in the region on water issues. The network partners have been inspired 
and informed by successful environmental cooperation projects in Palestine, Israel, and Jordan, as 
well as in Peru, Ecuador, and Cyprus. 
 
The week-long work group was facilitated by trained peace and conflict resolution studies 
experts. The week-long workshop in a neutral setting among partners from Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, countries which have stressed relationship with each other, helped to maintain an open 
minded and impartial stance towards conversations on building transboundary water cooperation 
strategies. The in-depth discussions between civic and scientific community from Afghanistan and 
Pakistan included 1) the political, environmental, social, technical, scientific, and regulatory 
challenges to water cooperation; 2) sub-state needs and expectations for different uses of water in 
the region such as urban development, food and irrigation, hydroelectric development, and mining; 
and 3) hopes for the future of the region and strategies to improve border relations, trust, sharing 
of benefits, and building water cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The workshop was 
an attempt at creating a localized and grassroots-based or civic and scientific-based adaptive 
framework for transboundary water cooperation in the Kabul Basin. This vision aligns with all 
international conventions and treaties on equitable sharing of resources and the Sustainable 
Development Goals of clean, accessible water, affordable and sustainable energy for all.  
 
The week-long discussions and mediations that transpired between the civic and scientific 
community was recorded, transcribed, and coded. We conducted a discursive analysis of the coded 
the interviews. Our primary codes of analysis included 1) the hydro-hegemonic governance 
challenges to water cooperation, 2) knowledge gaps that generate animosity between transboundary 
partners to inform building social learning strategies, and 3) identified opportunities for localized 
social learning, and situated knowledge construction that could influence local transboundary water 
cooperation. We used Zeitoun and Warner’s (2006) hydro-hegemony framework which included 
examination of 1) coercive compliance producing mechanism which include military force, covert 
actions and threats; 2) hegemonic compliance producing mechanism which includes securitization 
of resources, coercive water sharing conditionalities, sanctioned discourses, and construction of 
popular knowledge and the mobilization of both international support and financial clout and the 
abuse of riparian position; 3) utilitarian compliance mechanism such as incentivizing cooperation; 
and 4) normative compliance mechanism such as use of norms, treaties, international law often to 
the advantage.  
 
 
We incorporated social learning concepts from Folke et al. (2005) and Pahl-Wostl (2009), and 
identified social learning as opportunities for local capacity building, localized knowledge 
construction in partnership with the community-scientific collaboratives, and initiating 
transboundary exchange of social learning information gathered to further adaptive governance. In 
addition to the narrative analysis of discussions among the civic scientific partners from 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, we have substantiated their reports with valid sources from key journal 
articles, media reports, and policy briefs. Below we provide a brief overview of the Kabul River Basin 
followed by the results of the workshop.  
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Brief overview of the study site—Kabul River  
The Kabul River lies between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, creating a 
unique transboundary position and 
tension over water sharing, as both 
countries are upstream and downstream 
riparian partners. The Kabul River 
originates from the Sanglakh Range in 
the northwestern Hindu Kush 
Mountains of Afghanistan about 72 km 
west of Kabul. The Kabul River and its 
tributaries – Loghar, Panjshir, Ghorband, 
Laghman-Alingar, and Kunar rivers – 
irrigate 72,000 km² or 11 percent of 
Afghanistan’s land area (IUCN, 2010; 
Thomas, Azizi, & Behzad, 2016). Its 
largest tributary is the Kunar River 
located in the northeast part of 
Afghanistan, and is also a transboundary 
river bordering Pakistan.  
 
The Kunar River originates from 
glacial fields in the Hindu Kush Mountains in the Chitral region in Pakistan. As the Kunar River 
flows down from the Hindu Kush Mountains, the river is known by several names – Mastuj River, 
Latkoh River, and the Chitral River in Pakistan – before finally flowing into the Kunar Province in 
Afghanistan with an annual flow of 10km3 (IUCN, 2010).  The Kunar River runs downstream about 
180km before joining the Kabul River near Jalalabad. The combined rivers then flows 80 km 
eastward along the Khyber Pass back into Pakistan with renewable water potential of 55 km3/year, 
about half of which is used for agriculture in Afghanistan (IUCN, 2010). The Kabul River is the only 
river system in Afghanistan with an outlet to the sea as it joins the Indus River in the city of Attock 
in Pakistan (IUCN, 2010). The Kabul River thus is also part of the Upper Indus Basin. Though 
Pakistan’s dependency on Kabul River is limited, tensions over water, especially in the 
transboundary Kunar River, where both countries are upstream and downstream riparian partners 
is more pronounced as Afghanistan looks to rebuild their country from being in war since the Soviet 
invasion in the 1980s.  
RESULTS 
Below we detail the hydro-hegemonic frameworks that challenge water cooperation, 
knowledge gaps that generate animosity between transboundary partners, and identify 
opportunities for building localized civic-scientific social learning, and situated knowledge 
construction practices to enhance transboundary adaptive governance systems and water 
cooperation.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Kabul river basin and links to the Indus River. 
Source: Thomas et al., 2016.  
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Hydro-Hegemonic Challenges to Water Cooperation in the Kabul River Basin  
Hydro-hegemons expect states to maximize their relative power between their riparian 
partners. Zeitoun and Warner (2006) define hegemonic power systems as coercive compliance 
producing mechanisms, hegemonic compliance producing mechanism, utilitarian compliance 
producing mechanism, and normative compliance producing mechanism. We also find that these 
variations in hegemonic power structures may be influenced by historical aspects, geographical 
constraints, concerns about future water scarcity due to climate change in the Kabul River Basin 
contributing to the implementation of different hegemonic compliance mechanisms.  
Historical aspects that fuel coercive and hegemonic compliance regimes:  
The historical relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is complicated. Political 
animosity between Afghanistan and Pakistan date back five centuries since the founding of 
Pakistan in 1947 and Afghanistan’s continued refusal to accept the Durand Line as the formal 
border between Afghanistan and Pakistan as the ethnic, linguistic, and religious faiths of the 
communities settled on either side of the Durand Line are the same (Micallef, 2015a; 2015b). As 
one participant remarked, “it was like the British drew the border line through the heart of the 
Pashtun communities.” Historically, the participant noted, “there were no borders between the 
largely Pashtun and Kutch communities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kuchi tribes used to go to 
lowland Pakistan in the winter and moved to the higher mountains in Afghanistan in the summer 
time. They did not belong to any country, they had no citizenship.” Though the coercive and 
enforced boundaries drawn by the hegemonic power divided tribes and communities, the perceived 
desire for Pashtuns on both sides of the border to form “Pashtunistan” was seen a worrisome 
movement to Pakistan as well as Afghanistan’s support of Pashtun separatists in Pakistan (Micallef, 
2015a; 2015b). In turn, Pakistan military supported Taliban terrorist camps in Afghanistan 
(Micallef, 2015b; Saeed, Hassani, & Malyar, 2016; Thomas et al., 2016). Workshop participants from 
Afghanistan felt that: “Pakistan has been waging war against Afghanistan for the last 40 years. You 
cannot deny that. But I try to be diplomatic and not call it a war.” The adjacent areas along the 
border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Kunar River have been the most vulnerable to 
violent conflict, terrorism, and explosive land mines since the US-NATO invasion of Afghanistan 
in 2001. Between the Soviet invasion (1980s), Taliban uprising (1990s), the drought of 2000, and 
current conflicts, one in four Afghans have been a refugee, mostly in Pakistan and Iran (Ruiz, 2002). 
 
The participants noted that these long standing tensions over land disputes and borderlines 
have been quietly spilling over into disputes over water and Kabul River, and the hegemonic control 
of water resources especially by Iran and Pakistan, and recently India (Mashal, 2012; Thomas et al., 
2016, Kugelman et al., 2011). By some estimates, one-third of Afghanistan’s irrigation systems were 
directly affected by war (IUCN, 2010). Participants noted that as Afghan refugees return home, 
there is a growing demand for water in the agriculture and energy sectors. Diminished supplies of 
water flowing down from Kabul River to Pakistan has been a source of strain and conflict in severely 
water stressed Pakistan, leading to subtle coercive acts towards Afghanistan. Lack of water treaties 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan further aggravate issues of abusive threats and riparian control. 
The only water-sharing treaty that exists between these countries is the 1921 treaty signed between 
Afghanistan and Great Britain, which agrees to water withdrawal for residents in Torkham, 
Afghanistan, and for using the Kabul River for navigation and irrigation rights in Pakistan (Hearns, 
2015).  
 
Between 2003 and 2011, Pakistan and the World Bank incentivized cooperation by initiating 
discussions on a water treaty similar to the Indus Basin Treaty in order to build utilitarian and 
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normative compliance and institutional capacity to promote greater cooperation to avoid dispute 
over water issues. These initiatives have not been fruitful. Acute power asymmetries curtail dialogue 
and promote the view of unilateral resource capture and control within transboundary water 
resources development (Thomas et al., 2016), leading to absence of mechanisms for relieving water 
security concerns within the Kabul Basin.  
Geographic capacity and covert coercive actions:  
The Kabul River Basin is highly under-developed and its water resources are under-utilized. 
The participants discussion on water use in both countries concurred with the available metrics on 
water use. Afghanistan utilizes less than 25% of its surface water resources. Its groundwater use is 
less than a third of its total availability and shares 90% of its water resources with its neighbors 
(Mudabber, 2016). The storage capacity of water in Afghanistan is very poor and represents less 
than three percent of the average surface water availability (Thomas et al., 2016). Conflict and 
conflict-related deforestation further exhausts Afghanistan’s capability to store water (Price et al., 
2014). Due to geography, remoteness of the region, and conflict such as the persistence of 
landmines, many areas are unsafe to access, which was one of the major concerns noted by the 
participants.  
 
In contrast, the overall level of water use in Pakistan is very high, compared to available 
resources. Pakistan uses 70 percent of the available surface water and extracts more groundwater 
than the average annual recharge (Thomas et al., 2016). Pakistan also has lower water storage 
capacity (10%) and can barely store 30 days of water in the Indus basin, constraining irrigation 
development (Thomas et al., 2016). The total renewable water available in Pakistan (1378-1000 m3) 
is far lower than the world average (Kakakhel, 2017). Pakistan gets 13 percent of its water supply to 
the Indus basin from Afghanistan’s portions of the Kabul and Kunar rivers (Thomas et al., 2016). 
However, participants from Pakistan claimed that the Kabul river contributes 16 to 17 percent of 
Pakistan’s water supply, as stated in some unsubstantiated media sources (Kiani, 2013).  
 
Any increase in water use in Afghanistan (a projected 17 billion cubic meters (BCM) to 30 
BCM) threaten the dimensions of water use in Pakistan and its corresponding water security 
(Mudabber, 2016). Afghanistan also suffers from severe shortage of electricity, where only 28% of 
Afghan households have electricity (Kakakhel, 2017). Water scarcity is already acutely felt in 
Pakistan with increase in droughts and low storage capacity, according to the participants, an 
observation that has been noted by Thomas et al. (2016) and Saeed et al. (2016). Declining flows in 
the Kabul River has been previously observed in Attock, Pakistan (IUCN, 2010), potentially due to 
climatic variability and upstream uses in both Afghanistan and in the Peshawar region in Pakistan. 
The government of Afghanistan’s attempt at water infrastructure plans for irrigation and power 
generation in the Kunar River (IUCN, 2010; Thomas et al., 2016) have been cautiously monitored 
by Pakistan, who have also been accused of savage executions (Mashal, 2012) to deter the plans of 
Afghanistan to build hydroelectric dams on Kunar River. These speculations over water, created 
momentary deadlocks within our Afghan-Pakistani participants as well:  
 
 If Afghanistan implements all the dams on the Kabul River, it would only have a 3% of effect on 
Pakistan. Building of dams is perfectly legitimate for our utilization. In Asmar district (Suritoq location) 
in Kunar province, Afghanistan has been trying to build a dam, it has been sabotaged a number of times.  
This is the reason the people in the Kunar province are in the dark. Because we do not have electricity 
from Kunar River. Dams in Kunar is an important issue. We have terrorism, water issue, poverty, refugees, 
climate is another issue of conflict. Much of this can be addressed by putting those dams on. I do not think 
we can come up with a treaty. We cannot have the community die while we come to a consensus.  
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However, participants from Pakistan highlighted the country’s severe water shortage, sharing 
that any construction of dams without consultation a threat with the possibility of 17-20% reduction 
in available water flowing to Pakistan from such development. A study funded by the World Bank 
under the AWARD project found that the overall reduction in water flow towards Pakistan would 
only be three percent, especially between April to June, based on the construction of six dams 
(World Bank, 2013). However, the Pakistani government-funded Islamabad Institute of Policy 
Studies claims a 15-20 percent reduction in the available water from the foreseeable construction 
of 13 dams on Kabul River (Rizvi, 2003). Afghanistan believes that Pakistan has been sabotaging 
Afghan initiatives to increase hydropower development on the Kunar River and considers the 
presence of Pakistani militia on the border as a serious threat to any development in the region 
(Mashal, 2012).  
 
The primary issue that Pakistani participants objected to is Afghanistan building its water 
storage capacity: “If we can show with data that this is not going to impact Pakistan, given the 
climate variability, and access, then there can be a consensus.” Hydroelectric dams are often large, 
internationally funded projects, and are often the result of state-building. If the source is a 
transboundary river, the potential for contentions between the two countries are far greater. While 
hydro hegemonic projects are under state jurisdiction, they are still dependent on the mobilization 
of international support and financial clout and donor conditionalities which may also enforce a set 
of coercive compliance producing mechanisms. 
Neoliberal governance approaches and challenges to local water security:  
Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have a lot to gain from compromises and implementing 
cooperative strategies. Neoliberal paradigms are cooperative and focused on reducing conflicts by 
mitigating the compliance problems and mistrust, while seeing water management as the key to 
development, economic progress, and social benefits. Big infrastructural projects for development 
are governance projects of great state importance and projects of nation-building and 
modernization. 
 
Water is a key enabler for economic progress and social, and public good (Mirumachi, 2015). 
In a growing country, there are many water demands, not only to serve the growing urban 
population, but also for irrigation, agriculture, energy production, and other industrial applications. 
This paired with similar needs of a neighboring state that shares river systems, the calculations of 
water use and sharing can get easily tricky. Irrigation is the world’s largest use of water (70%), and 
this overall trend is reflected in both Pakistan and Afghanistan (UN, 2014). In Afghanistan over 
85% of the irrigated area is river-fed and only 15% is groundwater-fed. In the absence of more water 
storage capacity, most of the country’s surface water runs to neighboring states, including the Kabul 
River from Afghanistan to Pakistan. In Pakistan water demand has been steadily increasing. From 
the 1970s to the 1990s, water demand increased by 39 percent, largely due to intensifying irrigation 
and the increase in cropped agricultural area. The water from the Kabul River is indispensable to 
major cities such as Peshawar City, where over two million residents depend on the river for 
drinking water, sanitation, and irrigation (IUCN, 2010; Thomas et al., 2016). Hence any 
development in Afghanistan raises grave concerns across the border. 
 
Deforestation was highlighted as another huge challenge in both countries, and the lack of 
watershed management contributes to erosion downstream where the Kunar and Kabul Rivers 
intersect, as well as after the Kabul River crosses the Afghan-Pakistan border and joins the Indus 
River. Considerable potential exists for implementing soil conservation measures. Participants also 
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shared the observation that many water-related problems were connected to a larger set of 
environmental and social problems such as development and climate change. Baig & Al-Subaiee 
(2009) note that factors like deforestation, overgrazing, soil erosion, salinity, and waterlogging are 
posing major threats to biodiversity in the region, and any attempts to reverse losses are ineffective 
without local participation.  
 
Mining was also considered as an issue of concern among the participants to water security 
and cooperation. Both Pakistani and Afghan governments have been touting mining development; 
they have invited the mining industry to come in. In many places, Chinese companies are one 
example starting to develop mining operations as part of the new “Silk Road” project (Awan, 2018). 
One participant describes the threats that mining poses to water security and water quality: “So they 
want to put in a lot of these mining technologies to mine metals like iron and copper and other 
kinds of ores, but the mining can have a huge effect on the water pollution, it can also destroy the 
habitat. Mining it is an emergent threat.” New research articles show that there have been conflicts 
between insurgents over mineral resources. Taliban and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) 
militants are making millions from exporting minerals like talc, marble, and lapis lazuli in 
Afghanistan, generating revenue for insurgent groups and fueling a deadly cycle of violence in the 
country (Zia & Hameed, 2014; Hussain, 2018). Such illegal mining costs the Afghan government 
massive losses in revenue from precious metal deposits, which U.S. officials’ estimate contains up 
to $1 trillion in value (2010 USD) (Hussain, 2018). Additionally, Pakistan is the single biggest 
source of talc sold in the America. The effluents from these industries, marble and stone work, and 
pharmaceutical companies on Pakistan’s side, said the participants, are heavily polluting the river.  
 
A major concern among the participants, and an impact of the neoliberalizing efforts previous 
identified, are surrounding water quality. The Kabul River’s upper upstream rivers and tributaries 
are fast moving and filled with sediment and pollutants. In some provinces, especially Sindh and 
Punjab, the participants stated that the water quality is so bad the government has banned some 
companies from bottling the water (Asian News International (ANI), 2018). One of the participants 
remarked that “the trout is almost extinct – can you imagine the quality of water?” Water pollution 
from human and agricultural waste and other pollutants can spread pathogens and diseases, which 
can also be transported from one country to another. Waterborne diseases are high in both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Gulab, 2016; Gupta, 2017). 
 
Neoliberalization of water and nature assign economic than social value where natural 
resources are seen as instrumental to economic growth, progress, and techno-scientific 
development, which are essential projects of nation building, statehood, and modernization. Hence 
such activities of building hydroelectric dams, mining, and agriculture are also often subsidized 
activities for the cooperation and social benefit it provides. Such appropriation of resources to 
support causes of social progress and economic profit do impact upstream and downstream 
communities, but there are no effective ways to address these differences and cooperation across 
the borders are strained due to lack of coordination and treaties among national actors.  
Rural access to water and challenges to water security:  
Among conversations on transboundary water conflicts and cooperation, the participants felt 
that there was little focus on rural issues of concern related to water and assessing realities on the 
ground regarding local access to water. Afghanistan is among the poorest underdeveloped countries 
in the world (IUCN, 2010). People in the border areas in both countries are largely illiterate, have 
not attended school, and have low levels of education. The participants commented that women are 
especially affected by water security. Women often have to walk long distances (up to 5 kilometers) 
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to get water from the tributaries, carrying buckets of water, and at times with an infant on their 
back. And the water fetched is often untreated, with possible contaminants in it. The re-use of water 
is often not possible because these regions do not have the appropriate facilities for water treatment. 
The participants felt that “if women are educated and integrated into the economic streamline of 
the country, it is the cheapest investment in any foreign policy” regarding water resource 
management.  
 
Participants noted that access to water is especially poor in rural Afghanistan. Access to water 
for irrigation and agriculture in rural areas still remain a major problem as much of the 
infrastructure in the border areas in Afghanistan were destroyed and need to be rebuilt. Over 80% 
of the population do not have access to safe water in the rural areas (Gulab, 2016; Gupta, 2017). 
Communities directly on the river benefit, while those living far have to dig channels to gain access 
to water in some rural areas where possible. However, these rural social practices have been 
practiced for centuries. The participants noted that the water for subsistence irrigation is drawn 
from the small tributaries more so than the main branch of the Kabul River in rural Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.  
 
The right of water is also attached to right of land. Land tenure rights blocks access, as sections 
of land are often owned by few feudal lords. So the users have to get the consent of other tributaries’ 
users to dig such channels. Localized norms and practices thus still hold strong sway in building 
water security and cooperation. The participants recognized that the strains of water security were 
felt by all, even though there were differences in the emphasis of certain problems (e.g. scarcity vs. 
access) within and among the two countries. Participants recognized that addressing these issues 
require that people and the states work together to reallocate power by focusing on the needs of 
those who live along the rural border areas who are underrepresented within these transboundary 
water negotiations: “The way to get people involved is through water. If we talk about water, we are 
reframing the political tensions and collaborating around water.” This lays in contrast to the current 
reality in which conversations focus on nation building and economic progress, rather than catering 
to the needs of those living along the river corridors that are most disadvantaged and 
underprivileged.  
Knowledge gaps to water cooperation 
There is a poor understanding of the available water resources in the Kabul River basin to 
support good governance. The knowledge deficits in the water sector in the Kabul Basin have also 
been reflected in the report by IUCN (2010), which notes that the most reliable data for irrigated 
areas in Afghanistan dates back to 1967. The information deficit is greater in Afghanistan, but 
region-specific information in Northeast Pakistan in the Chitral region is also limited (IUCN, 2010; 
Saleem & Zia, 2016). The existing lack of reliable data also promotes political apathy, weak 
governance, lack of democratic institutions, red tapism, corruption, and a trust deficit. The 
participants strongly felt that data is essential for any discussion and negotiation to address water 
security concerns and conflicts, and for community mobilization. One participant explained the 
fundamental importance of good data: 
 If the data is not available, how can we say that Afghanistan and Pakistan need this much water 
annually? Why do Afghanistan/Pakistan claim these resources which do not belong to them? We don't 
know where the glaciers are, how fast they are melting, or the flow in different months of the year, the 
increase in temperature, change in relative humidity. The changes in the frequency and intensity of extreme 
events. Would glacier lake outbursts be an extreme event? 
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Another participant commented that there is no accurate count of the demographic variables 
in this region as well. Lack of data on water access in the region due to terrorism and land mines 
prevents portraying precise estimation of the burdens that the women and families in this region 
bear. The participants identified a need for proper research, which includes monitoring systems 
and a complete needs assessment on both sides of the border.  
 
Gathering data in the region is not a straightforward process due to mutual mistrust. The 
participants reiterated the importance of doing these studies in mutual agreement and 
collaboration–water use in both Pakistan and Afghanistan need to be cooperatively monitored and 
regulated to address water allocation issues and to generate trust and avoid conflicts. Another 
participated reiterated that state consent might be necessary so the data is not questioned. This, the 
participants suggested, might provide access to certain inaccessible areas due to conflict and 
government prohibition. Conducting a thorough study in the region will eventually require Track 
1 diplomacy involvement to gain access to appropriate regions, especially vulnerable regions. 
Government approval of the data is integral as it has authority over river discharge and 
management. Independent research, the participants noted, conducted by international consultants 
are seen as more credible. Other concerns they had were where the data should be gathered in the 
transboundary river. Participants suggested utilizing models such as community-based monitoring 
and citizen science may also help in gaining trust with data collection as well as mobilizing 
communities through local control of evidence based research data. The participants found that a 
lack of a treaty on the Kabul River is an opportunity to support a future treaty that results from both 
public consultation and scientific assessments, taking into consideration the local developmental 
needs in the region as well as the impacts of a changing climate.  
Building localized civic-scientific social learning and engagement networks for water cooperation 
and adaptive governance 
While state relations are fraught with complexity, the participants felt that the current water 
security issues Pakistan and Afghanistan face cannot be solved without transboundary 
cooperation—without the acknowledgement that Pakistan as well as Afghanistan has rights to its 
share of the water from the Kabul River and the right to develop its resources. The immediate 
problems identified from the workshop on transboundary water rights, allocation, and security were 
a lack of focus on benefits to the local and rural population in the region, lack of access to water in 
rural areas (80% in rural areas have no access to safe water), degrading water quality from multiple 
activities, and lack of scientific knowledge on the transboundary river systems to build better 
transboundary water relations, cooperation, and treaties. The participants agreed that the first step 
to building border relations is to bridge the gap between people and communities across borders. 
Solutions discussed to improve transboundary water rights and cooperation include improving 1) 
community building and engagement, 2) local capacity and civic-scientific social learning and local 
knowledge construction, and 3) transboundary engagement, exchange and advocacy with a specific 
focus on improving bilateral communication and trust across borders on managing water 
resources.  
Community building and engagement for trust building: 
 Trust deficit is one of the biggest problems between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and without 
addressing and building trust, the participants felt it would be difficult to build transboundary water 
cooperation. While the political animosity runs deep, the Pashtuns share historical, religious, and 
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cultural ethnolinguistic links that runs back thousands of years and the countries still share strong 
trade relations. The workshop participants agreed: “There is no conflict at the tribal level. They are 
brothers. The conflict is at the state level. We have to mobilize the civil society on both sides to 
compel our governments to sit and negotiate.” The working group agreed that starting with 
community building could be better in increasing trust: “there is a perception of conflict and 
insecurity… when you bring the community together, it is to create empathy, understanding, and 
trust. How can we find a way to influence and increase awareness?”  
 
Participants felt that the best way to engage and build the community in the region is by 
working with the exiting community groups on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Already 
in participation at the workshop were Community Motivation and Development and Organization 
(CMDO), a network of 1000 communities in Pakistan, and Coordination of Afghan Relief (COAR), 
a network that works with 33 communities in Afghanistan on water and sanitation issues. One of 
the participants remarked on the power of community groups:  
 
The community themselves can take charge. In my opinion when we are talking about public 
diplomacy, it has to be coming from ordinary people living on both sides of the border. It should reflect their 
concerns, needs, demands and their hopes for the future of the society and transboundary relationships.  
 
The suggestions by the community leaders included doing a public awareness campaign to 
build river-watching communities to clean, improve access, demine, demilitarize, and to increase 
cooperation across borders on the Kabul River. River basin organizations are commonly used 
management structures internationally to reduce conflicts (Molle & Hoanh, 2011; Mukhtarov & 
Gerlak, 2013; Petersen-Perlman et al., 2017; Yoffe et al., 2003). The structure for building regional 
cooperative river basin organizations already exists through the medium of COAR in Afghanistan 
and CMDO in Pakistan, rather than through national diplomatic means which alone may not foster 
cooperation and trust-building locally on the ground. Other avenues for community building 
discussed include targeting women, tribal leaders, religious leaders, setting up traditional 
community councils called jirgas, and engaging youth activists, all of whom can also be part of the 
river based organization in creating multi-level governance systems.  
 
Governance in these regions is primarily mediated through traditional councils. The 
constitution of jirgas are prominent in the tribal areas on both sides of the border. Matters related 
to conflicts and community decisions are often settled through convening jirgas (e.g. see Zia & 
Hameed, 2014). “It is a well-established and lubricated machine, a mechanism that works,” said 
one of the participants. Another participant suggested holding trans-border jirgas to talk about water 
issues. The authority of a jirga is so strong that no one questions them; furthermore, they do not 
need funding, and they do not have many of the pitfalls of bureaucracy (e.g., corruption, power 
differentials). It is not a bureaucratic but democratic system, as anyone can call a jirga. People also 
respect the elder of the village and the information they give.  
 
Dissemination of information in mosques and masjid through religious points of view can 
also be an effective way to convey messages by connecting water practices to religious beliefs. Youth 
activism is growing in these countries as well and was observed as a powerful tool to educate people 
and families: “Once you start mobilizing the young people, children can be real ambassadors of 
change.” The awareness campaign can also be done through mediums including, but not limited 
to, radio messages, television, mobile messages, and door-to-door awareness program. Once 
communities are mobilized, specific projects and issues of local concern can be discussed and 
debated. However it was noted that, equitable, open, and flexible cooperation on water allocation 
might be difficult by focusing only on stakeholder interests without the necessary data to back the 
interests for decision-making.  
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Local capacity and civic-scientific social learning and local knowledge construction:  
The need for data was obvious among participants to settle any misconceptions, distrust, 
differences, and conflict across borders as well as to promote peace: “Data can bring accountability 
and transparency.” It was realized that both sides need multiple levels of data to make informed 
decisions and to negotiate collaborative water management plans (also see Ali & Zia, 2016). The 
participants pointed out that there has not been systematic data collection on the region; even the 
existing demographic information in the region is not reliable as it is politically volatile. 
Additionally, the existing technical data is not collected in one place.  
 
The science diplomacy goals that the participants agreed to were 1) Build local capacity by 
setting up local social learning and knowledge construction initiatives that would also include 
citizen science or community-based monitoring stations that can be administered by farmers, 
fishermen, students, and community members with scientific partners; 2) synthesize existing 
baseline data, including satellite data on both countries as well as other relevant social, 
environmental, technical, health, and policy data into a central repository; 3) produce localized 
knowledge that can inform projects on the ground, conduct studies to understand the risks and 
benefits to both countries, as well as upstream and downstream communities under specific 
scenarios of development of hydroelectric dams, impacts of climate change, deforestation, 
urbanization, and mining or other local scenarios of concern; produce database that could help with 
early warning systems (EWS)—as both countries are facing extreme threats of flash flooding, 
landslides, drought. Presently there is no mechanism of sharing data between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, however, both countries realize that there should be a mechanism of sharing data that 
can save lives, infrastructure, and farmlands at both sides; 4) establish a knowledge sharing 
network, promote data exchange, transparency, and sharing to mitigate risks to reduce adverse 
outcomes and promote transboundary water sharing and basin management practices. Ways to 
address uncertainty, unexpected events, and emergencies emerged as a key challenges to address 
as well. This is where clearly defined obligations, procedures for cooperation and consensus are 
needed to make decisions under uncertainty and emergency situations (WWAP, 2012). Directing 
the focus on dispute prevention, resolution mechanisms, and adopting preventive measures and 
mutually beneficial negotiations might be essential in these cases to maintain peace and enhance 
cooperation. Additionally project participants suggested conducting evaluations of power relations 
between the tribal areas and countries, as well as conducting stakeholder and actor analyses. The 
goal is to build effective water cooperative strategies even without a Track 1 treaty. 
 
However, ministry level cooperation might be necessary to collect the data in the region, as the 
data must acceptable and legitimate to both the country officials to initiate peaceful negotiations. 
Reliable data about the transboundary watershed is essential for stakeholders to buy into 
cooperative frameworks, and cooperative transboundary problem solving (Petersen-Perlman et al., 
2017). As a community member remarked:  
 
Then they are in a better position to talk about what is the demand and what is the use [of water 
resources]. Then the goods and bads can be shared, the floods and droughts are shared based on the 
allocation formula. We can understand the baselines versus the variability. This will be negotiated by the 
critical parties as opposed to fighting with each other. 
 
The participants emphasized continual learning as one of the key features of adaptive 
management in building transboundary water cooperation and peace between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.  
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Transboundary engagement, exchange and advocacy on managing water resources:  
Social learning, knowledge construction, and advocacy go hand in hand. Stakeholder 
engagement, public participation, and opportunities for local social learning at the local and river 
basin level is essential in jointly managing, protecting, and developing water effectively and 
sustainably. Research demonstrates that where institutional capacity for dialogue and the 
management of disputes is present, conflict is less likely (Jägerskog, 2012; Subramanian et al., 2012; 
UNEP, 2008). Stakeholder platforms, river basin organizations (RBOs), and jirgas can be spaces 
where different stakeholders can articulate their concerns, manage differences, and come to 
settlements between countries, cities or sectors as well as play a crucial role in local water 
management. These steps of public diplomacy and science diplomacy are essential for Pakistan and 
Afghanistan to address transboundary water issues and development issues in the Kabul River 
Basin.  
 
A growing number of treaties, protocols, conventions, and institutional frameworks 
increasingly help crystallize mechanisms on the use, development and protection of shared 
freshwaters and peaceful resolution of disputes over water resources (Bigas, 2012; Gerlak, 2007; 
Subramanian, Brown, & Wolf, 2012; UN, 2013). Around 40% of the world’s transboundary basins 
are covered by some form of cooperative institutional arrangement (Gerlak, 2007). Studies also 
show that international water relations among riparian states with treaties are generally more 
cooperative than basins without treaties or other cooperative management mechanisms (Oregon 
State University Department of Geosciences, 2011). Treaties and cooperative institutional 
agreements though often suffer setbacks from lack of political will, inadequate water management 
structures, and lack of enforcement at national levels (Salman, 2007). 
 
Formal networks with regional and international third party involvement are also essential for 
the resiliency and success of transboundary water cooperation, in order to lessen the animosity and 
improve negotiations between the two countries. Third party involvement traditionally includes 
stakeholders who do not live in a shared basin but have interests in or influence on how shared 
waters are managed and allocated, such as development banks, experts, and environmental non-
profits. Third party groups could also be resident and/or refugee groups, such as Afghans residing 
abroad, who have the best interests in mind of their countries and have influence over its 
development (Petersen-Perlman, Veilleux, & Wolf, 2017). International multilateral engagements 
are increasingly employed in sustainable basin management. For example, the EU-funded 
SWITCH (Sustainable Water Management Improves Tomorrow’s Cities’ Health) research program 
brought stakeholders from a consortium of 33 partners from 15 countries, who jointly discussed 
problems and developed and tested ideas for sustainable integrated urban water management 
(Butterworth, McIntyre, & da Silva Wells, 2011).  
 
The participants in the workshop felt that a global network was essential to address 
transboundary challenges, to be taken seriously by the ministry, and to later build the base for goal 
three – the advocacy and lobbying campaign. The global network would also build bridges with 
Track 1 governmental diplomacy for broader transboundary cooperation and treaty building. This 
led to the conception and establishment of the Transboundary Water In-cooperation Network 
(TWIN), a network of networks that connects transboundary water groups globally.  
 
TWIN’s mission is to strengthen and mobilize organizational networks that work locally, 
nationally, and globally towards equitable and reasonable sharing of water resources across borders 
for food, energy, livelihood, and ecosystem services. TWIN’s vision is to build peaceful resolutions 
for water cooperation among stakeholders and nations, to improve border relations, water use 
practices, water quality, ecosystem services, and public health on both sides of the border, and build 
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resilience to climate change. TWIN abides by the UN Law of International Watercourses and 
Transboundary Aquifers and the UN Sustainable Development Goal 6 framework which includes 
1) the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, 2) obligation to not cause significant harm, 
3) obligation of cooperation in jointly managing, protecting and developing water resources, 4) 
mechanism of prior notification of and consultations on planned measures, 5) reduce and control 
pollution of shared aquifers and 6) peaceful settlement of disputes (UN General Assembly, 2014). 
 
In particular, TWIN focuses on facilitating negotiations between civic and scientific diplomacy 
by 1) enhancing community engagement and capacity building to promote water cooperation by 
helping to build localized social learning and knowledge construction practices to improve access 
to water and protect the quality of the water along transboundary rivers 2) identify the necessary 
information such as data collection, research, reports and mutually beneficial technical solutions to 
improve the quality of water resources, 3) convening meetings and negotiations to promote 
bilateral/multilateral communication across borders on managing water resources. Building 
multilateral relationships with network of organizations, professionals, and individuals are not easy 
when there is animosity between the countries. TWIN is committed to mediate cooperative 
discussions and negotiations in neutral grounds to build relationships and cooperative solutions to 
transboundary issues.  
 
Successful water negotiation, or reciprocal levels of communication frameworks, is essential 
to address interests, risks, and identity. As one program participant observed: “we have plans for 
the future, but it will only be possible by initiating transboundary water cooperation. We have to 
work together.” The participants identified that any governance and environmental diplomacy 
frameworks will have to address public interests foremost, and addressing risks that threatens 
identity, respect, and shared humanity. Put in the words of a participant: “we are concerned about 
the people. That's the first step. And the second step is trust-building. And the third step is to 
mobilize the communities from both sides to force their governments as a civil society to come to 
an agreement.” Conflict and cooperation are two sides of a coin. Lack of cooperation inevitably leads 
to conflict: civic participation and local-scientific knowledge construction are essential to build 
effective protocols for cooperation and evidence-based decision-making for lasting trust and 
peaceful relations among these neighbors in the Kabul Basins. 
Conclusion 
The management of water resources is essential to reduce poverty, increase sustainable 
economic and social development, improve quality of life for all, as well as to ensure an adequate 
supply of water for future generations of Afghans and Pakistanis. This research summarized the 
outcomes of the environmental diplomacy workshop held between Afghanistan and Pakistan on 
water cooperation in the Kabul River Basin, one of the most heavily conflicted transboundary river 
basins in the world. As Afghanistan and Pakistan are looking to modernize and build the nation, 
dependent upon neoliberal ideologies that increase the need for techno-scientific developments to 
increase productions and economic growth in agriculture, mining, energy production, and other 
manufacturing and social enterprises, the demand for water is increasing. Water scarcity is already 
beginning to be felt in Pakistan and its future further made indeterminate due to the uncertainties 
that climate change brings with its unpredictable shifts in glacial melts, flash floods, heat waves, 
and droughts with severe consequences to water security. Strategies for dealing with water security 
are still dealt with state-centric coercive, hegemonic compliance producing mechanism where 
relative power determines the outcomes of discussions on bilateral water issues. The immediate 
problems identified to transboundary water rights, allocation, and security within this workshop 
included lack of focus on benefits to the local and rural population in the region, lack of access to 
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water in rural areas, degrading water quality from multiple activities, and lack of scientific 
knowledge on the transboundary river systems to build better transboundary water relations, 
cooperation, and treaties. New adaptive governance strategies are needed to identify local concerns 
with water rights, allocation, and bilateral water cooperation among riparian partners to generate 
effective solutions for both sustainable use and conservation of water resources.  
 
The workshop also highlighted that transboundary water cooperation can be a powerful avenue 
for peace-building, to ease the strained border relationships and political tensions. The workshop 
stressed that one does not have to wait decades to formulate an official Kabul River Basin treaty to 
enforce water cooperation. Rather, cooperation starts with people on the ground and across the 
borders, who are of the same tribe and culture, who were separated by colonial drawing of 
boundaries. We show that Track 2 and Track 3 science and public diplomacy, or collaborative civic-
scientific social learning and engagement network can be an effective framework for building 
transboundary adaptive governance systems. Such an effort on social learning and adaptive 
governance is focused on building a bottom-up process, by strengthening 1) community building 
and engagement, 2) local capacity and civic-scientific social learning and local knowledge 
construction capacity, and 3) transboundary engagement, exchange and advocacy with a specific 
focus on improving bilateral communication and trust across borders on managing water 
resources. The workshop also laid the foundation to the conception and establishment of the 
Transboundary Water In-cooperation Network (TWIN), a network of networks that connects 
transboundary water groups globally.  
 
TWIN’s mission is to strengthen and mobilize both local, national, and global organizational 
networks that work towards equitable and reasonable sharing of water resources across borders for 
food, energy, livelihood, and ecosystem services. TWIN’s vision is to build peaceful resolutions for 
water cooperation among stakeholders and nations, to improve border relations, water use 
practices, water quality, ecosystem services, resilience to climate change, and public health on both 
sides of the border. TWIN has also incorporated the solutions identified by the workshop 
participants on facilitating negotiations between civic and scientific diplomacy by 1) enhancing 
community engagement and capacity building to promote water cooperation by helping to build 
localized social learning and knowledge construction practices to improve access to water and 
protect the quality of the water along transboundary rivers 2) identify the necessary information 
such as data collection, research, reports and mutually beneficial technical solutions to improve the 
quality of water resources, 3) convening meetings and negotiations to promote bilateral/multilateral 
communication across borders on managing water resources. Democratic participation, and social 
learning can be solutions to clear local misconceptions, improve transboundary water governance 
and ecological stewardship in the Kabul River Basin and to build more trusting and peaceful 
relations among these neighboring countries. Initializing localized transboundary civic-scientific 
social learning capacities and exchanges can be a powerful avenue to building a localized adaptive 
governance framework. 
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